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earnings that the partners generate from unfinished, pending hourly
matters? Most states that have addressed the issue hold that unless the
partners agree otherwise, all profits from unfinished business belong not to
the partners who complete the matters but, rather, to all partners of the
former law firm. This so-called unfinished business doctrine has been
criticized for impinging clients’ choice of counsel because it creates
financial disincentives that may encourage attorneys to withdraw from
pending matters, given that they would need to share earnings with former
partners. The law is unsettled in New York, and in 2012, two judges in the
Southern District of New York examined whether the unfinished business
doctrine applies to hourly matters. They arrived at different conclusions,
creating a split in the district. This Note argues that the unfinished business
doctrine applies to hourly matters because it does not violate public policy
by improperly deterring attorneys from practicing law. Nevertheless, this
Note proposes a statutory amendment for New York and certain other
states that would mitigate the financial disincentives that the unfinished
business doctrine creates by allowing partners to earn reasonable
compensation for winding up unfinished business.
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INTRODUCTION
Economic conditions over the past several years have forced courts
and partners of law firms to face an issue that they may have never
contemplated: when a law firm goes out of business, who is entitled to the
earnings that the partners subsequently generate from unfinished, pending
matters—and does the answer depend on whether a matter is billed on
contingency or by the hour?
If a partnership agreement is silent on the issue of unfinished business,
state partnership law provides the answer. However, the law, which has
multi-million dollar implications,1 is unsettled in New York. This is rather
ironic, considering that New York is home to many of the most interesting
and sophisticated legal matters, including the recent bankruptcy of one of
the largest law firms, Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP.2
Most states that have addressed the issue hold that the unfinished
business of a former law firm belongs to the former partnership unless the
1

The unfinished business of Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP was valued at approximately $60 million.
Casey Sullivan & Nate Raymond, Ex-Dewey Partners Agree to Pay at Least $50 Million in Settlement,
REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2012, 1:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/17/us-dewey-settle-idUS
BRE87F1EE20120817. Because the Dewey partnership agreement did not waive the partnership’s
rights to unfinished business, New York partnership law controls. See Motion of the Official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors for Entry of an Order Pursuant to §§ 1103(c) and 1109(b), Granting Leave,
Standing and Authority to Prosecute and, if Appropriate, Settle Certain Claims on Behalf of the
Debtor’s Estate, Exhibit A at 25–36, In re Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, 478 B.R. 627 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 12-12321 (MG)), ECF No. 628. Though many former Dewey partners have agreed to
settlements, some settlements with Dewey’s largest earners do not resolve claims involving unfinished
business. Dewey & LeBoeuf, 478 B.R. at 633.
2
See Jennifer Smith & Ashby Jones, Storied Law Firm Dewey Files Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., May
29, 2012, at A1.
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partners agree otherwise.3 The rationale is that because partners owe
fiduciary duties to one another as they wind up the firm, the partners who
continue to complete the unfinished business do so for the benefit of all
former partners.4 Jewel v. Boxer,5 a California appellate court opinion, is
the seminal case that embraced this principle, often referred to as the
unfinished business or Jewel doctrine. The doctrine has been criticized for
impinging clients’ choice of counsel because it creates financial
disincentives that may encourage attorneys to withdraw from client
matters, given that the attorneys would need to share earnings with former
partners.6 Because Jewel dealt with unfinished business billed on
contingency, litigants have argued that the doctrine does not apply to
matters billed by the hour.7
In 2012, two judges in the Southern District of New York, writing
opinions for separate cases, thoroughly examined whether the doctrine
applies to hourly matters.8 They arrived at different conclusions, creating a
split in the district. The point of contention between the two opinions
primarily involves the weight each judge gave to the New York Court of
Appeals’ interpretation of an ethics rule prohibiting agreements that restrict
an attorney’s ability to practice law.9 The first judge to address the issue
narrowly read the Court of Appeals’ interpretation and held that the
unfinished business doctrine encompasses hourly matters.10 The second
judge gave a broader reading to the interpretation and held that the doctrine
does not apply to hourly matters because such an application violates
public policy.11 Both judges certified their decisions for interlocutory

3

See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Ashdale (In re Labrum & Doak, LLP), 227 B.R.
391, 408–09 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing jurisdictions that have adopted the unfinished business
doctrine).
4
See Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (Ct. App. 1984).
5
203 Cal. Rptr. 13.
6
See generally Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law
Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1597, 1597–619
(1985).
7
See, e.g., Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 738–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Dev.
Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Robinson v. Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1997); Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 333 n.20 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009);
Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 407; Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 572 (Ct. App. 1993).
8
See Geron, 476 B.R. at 738–43; Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 331–46.
9
Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989).
10
See Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 340–44, 349.
11
See Geron, 476 B.R. at 740, 742–43.
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appeal to the Second Circuit,12 which in turn certified questions to the New
York Court of Appeals.13
This split in the Southern District of New York and the pendency of
the certified questions before the New York Court of Appeals present an
opportunity to explore whether the unfinished business doctrine should
apply to hourly matters. This Note argues that the doctrine applies to hourly
matters because it does not violate public policy by improperly deterring
attorneys from practicing law. Ultimately, I propose a statutory amendment
that New York and certain other states could adopt to ameliorate the
negative externalities affecting client choice that the unfinished business
doctrine creates.
Part I explains the difference between how fees generated from
pending matters are divided among partners when law firms dissolve and
wind up, as compared to when partners withdraw from law firms. It further
explores how the unfinished business doctrine may infringe clients’ choice
of counsel and negatively affect a former partner’s prospects of being
admitted as a partner at another law firm. Part II discusses the two recent
cases in the Southern District of New York and analyzes the main
arguments of each case. Part III argues that the unfinished business
doctrine applies to hourly matters but that the application of the doctrine in
New York is not ideal, especially because it creates elevated financial
disincentives for attorneys who continue to work on hourly client matters.
Part III next proposes a solution that would reduce the financial
disincentives of the unfinished business doctrine by allowing partners to
earn reasonable compensation for winding up unfinished business.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS DOCTRINE
The law of partnerships is a creature of state law.14 Partnership
agreements may set forth the rights and duties among partners, but when an
issue or dispute arises that the partnership agreement has not addressed—or
when no partnership agreement exists—state law fills in the gaps.15
Although partnership law differs state by state, each state’s partnership law
is largely based on the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) or the more updated
12

Id. at 745; Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, No. 11 civ. 5994
(CM), 2012 WL 2952929 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012).
13
Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. K&L Gates LLP (In re Coudert Bros.), No. 12-4916 (L) (2d Cir. Dec. 2,
2013) (Bloomberg Law, Dockets, Req. No. 83), certified questions accepted, 2014 WL 113013 (N.Y.
Jan. 14, 2014); Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213 (2d Cir.), certified
questions accepted, 2013 WL 6499301 (N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013).
14
See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE:
GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 1:1, at 5–6 (2012).
15
See 1 CHRISTINE HURT ET AL., BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.02(b), at 1:26–
:27 (2013); see also, e.g., Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (Ct. App. 1984) (applying California’s
partnership law because the partnership agreement was silent about how attorneys’ fees from unfinished
business should be allocated among partners).
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version, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA).16 New York’s
partnership law parallels the UPA. The unfinished business doctrine is a
judicial gloss on partnership law that arises when a law firm dissolves and
winds up.
This Part discusses the unfinished business doctrine and how it
influences the way partners divide earnings when a law firm partnership
dissolves and winds up, but not when one or more partners withdraw from
a partnership. It further explains how the unfinished business doctrine may
negatively affect clients’ choice of counsel and a former partner’s prospects
of becoming a partner at another firm.
A. Partnership Dissolution Versus Partner Withdrawal
Two ways a partner’s association with a law firm terminates are when
the firm as a whole dissolves and winds up or when the partner resigns or
withdraws from the firm. This section describes how partners typically
divide fees from client matters when a law firm dissolves and winds up as
compared to when a partner withdraws from the firm.
1. Partnership Dissolution.—When a law firm partnership dissolves,
whether by choice or due to bankruptcy, the firm enters the winding-up
phase.17 Winding up typically involves “completing all of the partnership’s
uncompleted transactions, . . . reducing all assets to cash, and . . .
distributing the proceeds, if any, to the partners.”18 During this process, the
partnership continues to exist until the business of the firm has been wound
up.19 Further, while partners wind up the partnership, they continue to owe
fiduciary duties to one another because they are winding up the business
for the benefit of the partnership.20
A significant question arises when a law firm partnership dissolves:
are pending client matters assets of the partnership subject to winding up?
Thus, if the former partners continue working on the unfinished cases, do
their fiduciary duties require them to share the earnings with other
partners? This question arises from vagueness in the UPA, RUPA, and
many partnership agreements. The UPA and RUPA do not define what
winding up entails, and law firm partnership agreements often fail to define

16

UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) [hereinafter RUPA]; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914) [hereinafter UPA]. The
partnership law of twelve states is based on the original UPA from 1914, while the partnership law of
thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia is based on the revised version, RUPA. See Partnership
Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Partnership%20Act (last
visited Nov. 24, 2013). Louisiana is the only state whose partnership law is not based on the UPA or
RUPA. Id.
17
See RUPA, supra note 16, §§ 801–802; UPA, supra note 16, §§ 30–31.
18
WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 227, at 369 (3d ed. 2001).
19
RUPA, supra note 16, § 802; UPA, supra note 16, § 30.
20
See GREGORY, supra note 18, § 227, at 369.
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the parameters of winding up.21 Consequently, if litigation ensues, this
question is left to the court.
Courts and treatises generally interpret winding-up activities broadly.22
Many courts have held that pending client matters are unfinished business
of the firm—partnership assets that are subject to winding up.23 Jewel v.
Boxer,24 the influential case on the unfinished business or Jewel doctrine,
was decided by the California Court of Appeal in 1984 and is often cited
uncritically and at face value for the proposition that unfinished, pending
client matters are assets of the firm subject to winding up.25
Jewel involved a four-partner law firm that dissolved by mutual
agreement.26 After the firm dissolved, the former partners informed the
clients they represented that the firm no longer existed.27 Thereafter, the
clients signed forms that substituted the former law firm with the new firms
where the attorneys who previously handled their cases had become
partners.28 Two of the former partners filed suit, seeking to recover what
they believed was their portion of the profits that the other partners
generated on pending, unfinished cases.29 The trial court allocated fees
earned after the dissolution to the partners on a quantum meruit basis,
which took into account the time the partners spent on the cases before and
after the firm dissolved, and the plaintiffs appealed.30 Because the law firm
had no partnership agreement, both the trial and appellate courts relied on
California’s codification of the UPA.31
The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court’s quantum meruit
allocation of the fees, focusing on the plain language of the UPA.32 The
court recognized the UPA’s so-called no-compensation rule, which
prevents a partner from taking additional compensation “for acting in the
21

See Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Ct. App. 1984) (“[C]ontrary to the sound legal advice
they undoubtedly always gave their partnership clients, they had no written partnership agreement.”);
Robert W. Hillman, Law Firm Risk Management in an Era of Breakups and Lawyer Mobility:
Limitations and Opportunities, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 449, 454 (2011) (“In practice, . . . law firm
partnership agreements often are ill-conceived, poorly drafted, and hopelessly out of date.”).
22
See, e.g., GREGORY, supra note 18, § 227, at 368 (noting that the winding-up period ends when
“all the partnership affairs have been wound up”).
23
See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Ashdale (In re Labrum & Doak, LLP), 227 B.R.
391, 408–09 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing jurisdictions that have adopted the unfinished business
doctrine).
24
203 Cal. Rptr. 13.
25
See Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 739 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
26
203 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
27
Id. at 15–16.
28
Id. at 16.
29
See id.
30
See id.
31
See id. at 16–17. California has since revised its partnership law to parallel RUPA. See
Partnership Act, supra note 16.
32
See Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 16–19.
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partnership business,” absent an agreement to the contrary.33 It explained
that because a partnership continues to exist until the partners complete the
unfinished partnership business, and because the partners are not entitled to
additional compensation for completing unfinished business, income
generated from unfinished business—less reasonable overhead expenses
that do not include partners’ salaries—should be allocated among all of the
former partners according to each partner’s percentage interest in the firm.34
This is the unfinished business doctrine, a judicial interpretation of the duty
to account that partners owe one another while they wind up a partnership.
The Jewel court rejected a number of arguments. First, it rejected the
contention that because a client has the absolute right to discharge an
attorney, the former partners are only entitled to the value of the services
performed before the client discharged the former law firm.35 The court
reasoned that the duties partners owe one another are separate from a
client’s right to discharge an attorney.36 Second, the court rejected the idea
that the substitution forms that the clients signed transmuted the unfinished
business into new business.37 Otherwise, a former partner would be
permitted to breach the fiduciary duty of loyalty and take advantage of
opportunities belonging to the partnership for personal gain.38 Third, though
the doctrine could arguably discourage attorneys from continuing to
represent clients because they would only be entitled to a fraction of the
income they generated, the court noted that the partners were entitled to the
same share of income as if the firm had not broken apart.39 The court
further noted that each attorney would receive a portion of the fees that the
other former partners were generating from unfinished business.40 It
explained that because each former partner has a duty to wind up the
partnership, former partners should not face “undue hardship” in winding
33

UPA, supra note 16, § 18(f). However, a partner is entitled to additional compensation for
winding up the partnership after another partner’s death. Id. The no-compensation rule is where the
UPA and RUPA diverge with respect to the unfinished business doctrine. Under RUPA, a partner is
entitled to “reasonable compensation for services rendered in winding up the business of the
partnership.” RUPA, supra note 16, § 401(h). Thus, under RUPA, a partner who completes unfinished
business after a partnership dissolves is entitled to additional compensation, while a partner who
completes unfinished business under the UPA is not. See Mark I. Weinstein, The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act: An Analysis of Its Impact on the Relationship of Law Firm Dissolution, Contingent
Fee Cases and the No Compensation Rule, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 857, 871–72 (1995).
34
Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 16, 19.
35
See id. at 17–18.
36
See id. at 17 (“[T]he right of a client to the attorney of one’s choice and the rights and duties as
between partners with respect to income from unfinished business are distinct and do not offend one
another. Once the client’s fee is paid to an attorney, it is of no concern to the client how that fee is
allocated among the attorney and his or her former partners.”).
37
See id. at 18.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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up the unfinished business.41 Moreover, to the extent that there is undue
hardship, the court reasoned that it exists because the former partners failed
to enter into an agreement that specified the allocation of earnings from
unfinished business.42
The court also acknowledged policy reasons for the unfinished
business doctrine, appearing concerned about the relationship among
partners. It reasoned that without the doctrine, partners would compete for
the most profitable cases, thinking that they would be able to keep fees
from those cases should the partnership dissolve.43 It might also diminish
the likelihood that former partners will steal client files so that they can
continue working on existing matters for personal gain after the firm
dissolves.44 Ultimately, the unfinished business doctrine arises out of the
duties partners owe one another when a partnership winds up. The doctrine
recognizes pending cases as assets of the partnership subject to winding up.
2. Partner Withdrawal.—In practice, the unfinished business
doctrine that Jewel established does not apply when one or more partners
withdraw from a law firm; it is usually only invoked when a law firm
dissolves and subsequently winds up.45 Technically, when a partner
withdraws from a law firm, in New York and under the UPA, the
partnership automatically dissolves and enters the winding-up phase.46
However, when the withdrawing partner agrees, the remaining partners
may buy out the departing partner’s interest in the firm and continue the
partnership.47 This avoids the need for the partnership to wind up and
liquidate assets, collect accounts receivable, and distribute proceeds to the
partners.48
The unfinished business doctrine does not apply when a partner
withdraws because the payment to the departing partner, in theory,
constitutes winding up.49 Thus, dissolution and winding up occur “only in

41

Id.
See id. at 19.
43
Id. at 18. Arguably, it may be questionable whether competition for client matters among
partners is always bad policy from the standpoint of a client. But see Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 N.E.2d
413, 417 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (explaining how “case-chasing by attorneys” places clients “in the middle
of a dispute among the partners over money”).
44
Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
45
Douglas R. Richmond, Migratory Law Partners and the Glue of Unfinished Business, 39 N. KY.
L. REV. 359, 370 (2012) (“[C]ourts tend to apply the unfinished business doctrine only when a law firm
dissolves and ultimately terminates its affairs . . . .”).
46
See N.Y. P’SHIP LAW §§ 60–61, 62(1)(b) (McKinney 2006); UPA, supra note 16, §§ 29–30,
31(1)(b).
47
2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP
§ 7.11(a), at 7:154.7–.8 (2013).
48
See id.
49
See id. § 7.01(b), at 7:14.
42
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the technical sense.”50 Once a partner’s interest has been settled, the partner
no longer owes fiduciary duties to the other partners.51 The withdrawing
partner may then solicit former clients and continue to work on cases that
were pending when the partner withdrew, without having to share fees.52
Therefore, in practice, partners only have a duty to share fees from pending
client matters when a law firm dissolves and winds up.
B. How the Unfinished Business Doctrine Affects Client Choice
While the unfinished business doctrine may attempt to ensure the fair
distribution of earnings from partnership business when partnerships wind
up, the doctrine also creates negative externalities. In states with
partnership law statutes that parallel the UPA, such as New York, the
doctrine may impede a client’s choice of counsel. It may impose economic
disincentives on a partner and the new firm that the partner joins for
working on the client’s unfinished matter, thereby inducing the partner to
withdraw from the case. The economic disincentives arise because the UPA
requires former partners to share earnings on client matters without the
right to additional compensation.53
As an illustration, assume that a law firm of five partners dissolves and
that each of those partners is entitled to 20% of the firm’s profits. Under the
Jewel doctrine, if one of those five partners joins a new law firm as a
partner—and the new firm continues working on unfinished business of the
former firm—the new firm would only be entitled to the former partner’s
20% stake; each of the four other former partners are entitled to their 20%
share. Further, the partner who joined the new firm is only entitled to a
fraction of the 20% to which the new firm is entitled. If the partner also has
a 20% stake in the new firm, the partner is now only entitled to 4% of
earnings from unfinished business. Thus, the partner’s interest in the matter
declined from 20% to 4%, while the other partners at the new firm may
only retain the remaining 16% of earnings that the firm bills.54 The
remaining four partners of the dissolved firm, who contribute nothing,
collectively earn more than the partner and the new firm that completes the
unfinished business.
50

Id.
See id. § 7.01(b), at 7:9–:13.
52
See Kelly v. Smith, 611 N.E.2d 118, 119–21 (Ind. 1993) (declining to apply the unfinished
business doctrine after a partner withdrew from a law firm and continued working on a pending matter
of his former firm).
53
See generally Epstein & Wisoff, supra note 6, at 1597–619. The economic disincentives would
not be as great in states that have adopted RUPA because RUPA eliminated the no-compensation rule
that exists in the UPA. See supra note 33. Under RUPA, partners are entitled to additional
compensation for completing unfinished business. See supra note 33.
54
The economic disincentives illustrated in this example would not exist for a partnership with an
“eat-what-you-kill” profit structure, where partners are entitled to the earnings from their own client
matters.
51
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This dilution of earnings creates an opportunity cost that may make
lawyers and the new firms that they join unwilling to continue representing
clients with unfinished business. Professor Hillman acknowledged that the
Jewel doctrine “may produce situations in which partners attempt to shed
cases requiring substantial additional work but little in the way of economic
incentives” because partners complete unfinished business without earning
additional compensation.55 Two commentators have referred to this
economic disincentive as locking out a client from having a matter handled
by the attorney of the client’s choice.56 The problem becomes magnified
when a former firm’s unfinished business is comprised of matters that take
years to resolve because the doctrine requires partners to share fees until
the matters are completed.57 Therefore, if a lawsuit continues for ten years,
the partners continue to owe fiduciary duties to one another—albeit only
with respect to the unfinished business—and must share the fees from the
suit with each other during this ten-year period.58
Although ethics rules impose some limitations on when attorneys may
withdraw from representing clients, in practice, the rules may not prevent
attorneys from withdrawing from pending cases after a law firm dissolves.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct allow an attorney to withdraw
from representing a client if “withdrawal can be accomplished without
material adverse effect on the interests of the client,” or for one of several
other reasons.59 The Model Rules explicitly allow an attorney to resign if
continued representation would cause the attorney to face an “unreasonable
financial burden,” even if withdrawal would be materially adverse to the
client.60 The unfinished business doctrine might create such a burden
depending on an attorney’s financial situation. Further, the Model Rules
55

ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF PARTNER
WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 2.8.1, at 2:166 (2d ed. 2013).
56
See Epstein & Wisoff, supra note 6, at 1599–600. But see Richmond, supra note 45, at 418
(arguing that there is no evidence that the lock-out problem exists).
57
See Hillman, supra note 21, at 465 (“Winding up a law firm may be a protracted process that
extends for several years, particularly when the business being wound up includes complex litigation or
contingent fee cases.”); see also Redman v. Walters, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42, 44–45 (Ct. App. 1979)
(illustrating how a pending case may lengthen the winding-up period of a law firm). Some courts have
specified that matters that are later appealed after a law firm dissolves constitute new business not
subject to the unfinished business doctrine. See, e.g., Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
& Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Talley v. Lamb, 100 N.Y.S.2d 112, 117–18
(Sup. Ct. 1950)); Platt v. Henderson, 361 P.2d 73, 86 (Or. 1961).
58
See HILLMAN, supra note 55, § 4.6.3, at 4:70-8. During the winding-up phase, partners may
compete with their former partners and seek opportunities for themselves to serve clients on new
matters. See In re Silverberg, 438 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (App. Div. 1981) (citing Talley, 100 N.Y.S.2d at
118).
59
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (2013).
60
Id. r. 1.16(b)(6); see also Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 630 A.2d 820, 831–32 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (holding that an attorney may withdraw from representation if a case poses
an unreasonable financial burden, even if the client would suffer material adverse effects).
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allow an attorney to withdraw for “good cause,” even if withdrawal would
be materially adverse to the client.61 A lawyer might explain to a judge, for
instance, that joining a new firm would interfere with the lawyer’s ability to
best represent the client when, in fact, the lawyer is merely concerned that
the case is no longer profitable.62 Therefore, in practice, the ethics rules
may not protect clients or guard against the financial-disincentive
externality that the unfinished business doctrine creates.
The unfinished business doctrine may also negatively impact a former
partner’s prospects of becoming a partner at another law firm. The reason
for this is that the doctrine may impose liability on a new firm that
completes unfinished business that a former partner brings.63 Oftentimes,
the value of a newly admitted partner to a law firm is based on the partner’s
existing client relationships. If a law firm would be required to disgorge
earnings to a dissolved law firm, the value that a prospective partner brings
to the new firm is diminished. The new firm may be unwilling to assume
this liability and decide not to take on a prospective new partner for this
reason.
The consequences are real and substantial for law firms that take on
lateral partners who bring unfinished business. In 2010, Baker & McKenzie
LLP agreed to a $6.65 million settlement to compensate the bankruptcy
estate of Coudert Brothers LLP for the profits Baker earned on unfinished
business.64 This was in addition to nearly $17 million of contingency fees
from unfinished business that Baker agreed to forfeit.65 In 2011, Covington
& Burling LLP paid a $4 million settlement to the bankruptcy estate of

61

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(7).
But see Vollgraff v. Block, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437, 440 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (concluding that “mere
dissolution of the defendants’ law partnership was ineffective to terminate the partners’ obligations as
attorneys toward partnership clients”).
63
See Joan C. Rogers, Law Firm’s Organizational Form, Insolvency Affect Extent of Members’
Personal Liability, 28 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 163, 165 (2012). One court relied on
the state’s codification of Section 13 of the UPA, which imposes liability on a partnership for a
partner’s wrongful acts in the ordinary course of business. See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, No. 11 civ. 5994 (CM), 2012 WL 2952929, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. July 18,
2012). The court held that the partners’ breach of fiduciary duties to their dissolved law firm—bringing
unfinished business to new firms—constituted a wrongful act for which the new firms were liable. See
id. Another court held that a firm taking on a partner of a dissolved law firm could be held liable under
an interference-with-contract cause of action. See Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr.
180, 192–94 (Ct. App. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi
Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1994). A new firm may have to disgorge earnings from unfinished
business if the dissolved firm modified its partnership agreement to waive the application of the
unfinished business doctrine on the eve of bankruptcy. See Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 338–48 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding
that such a waiver could constitute a fraudulent transfer made while the law firm was insolvent).
64
Joyce E. Cutler, Jewel Under Scrutiny in Bankruptcy Court as Fights over Unfinished Business
Continue, 29 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 22, 23 (2013).
65
Id.
62
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Heller Ehrman LLP.66 More recently, Baker & Hostetler LLP agreed to pay
$41 million to the bankruptcy estate of Howrey LLP to settle claims
involving matters that eleven former Howrey partners brought to the firm.67
Additionally, Paul Hastings LLP and two former Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP
partners who now practice at Paul Hastings agreed to pay close to $1.6
million to settle unfinished business claims with the bankruptcy estate of
Dewey.68 Over the next few years, certain former partners of Dewey and
the firms they join may be subject to unfinished business suits for tens of
millions of dollars.69 This potential liability that a new firm may take on
might negatively affect a former partner’s prospects of becoming a partner
at a new firm. And if a partner is unable to become a partner at a new firm,
the corollary effect is that a client’s choice of counsel may be infringed if
the partner does not have the wherewithal to handle the case alone.
In short, the unfinished business doctrine applies to pending cases
when a law firm dissolves and winds up if the partnership agreement does
not waive the doctrine. The unfinished business doctrine may impose
externalities that affect a client’s choice of counsel because the doctrine
may create economic disincentives for a partner and the partner’s new firm
that continue working on unfinished business. Moreover, the doctrine may
make it more difficult for a former partner to join a new law firm. One
significant question remains: does it matter whether unfinished business is
billed on contingency or by the hour? The next two Parts consider this very
issue.
II. THE SPLIT WITHIN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Despite the fact that New York City is the largest legal market,70 the
state’s highest court, the New York Court of Appeals, has yet to address
whether or how the unfinished business doctrine applies to law firms.
During 2012, in separate cases, two district judges in the Southern District
of New York considered the issue of whether the doctrine applies to

66

Id.
Jacqueline Palank, Trustee Strikes Key Deals in Winding Down Howrey, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19,
2013, at B4.
68
Martha Neil, Paul Hastings, 2 Partners to Pay $1.6M to Settle Dewey Unfinished Business
Claim, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 6, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/paul_hastings_2_
partners_to_pay_1.6m_to_settle_dewey_unfinished_business_cl.
69
See supra note 1 (explaining that Dewey’s partnership agreement did not waive the application
of the unfinished business doctrine, that the bankruptcy settlements with some of Dewey’s largest
earners did not resolve claims for unfinished business, and that Dewey’s unfinished business was
valued at $60 million).
70
See Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate WhiteCollar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2011).
67
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matters law firms bill by the hour.71 This Part discusses and analyzes each
case.
The first judge to address the issue held that the unfinished business
doctrine applies to hourly matters,72 while the second judge held that it does
not.73 Both judges certified their decisions for interlocutory appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.74 The Second Circuit granted both
interlocutory appeals and certified questions to the New York Court of
Appeals, which the court has accepted but not yet answered.75
The New York Court of Appeals will likely reexamine Cohen v. Lord,
Day & Lord,76 one of its decisions that courts in many jurisdictions have
cited.77 In Cohen, the court held that a provision in a partnership agreement
that restricted an attorney’s ability to practice law and a client’s choice of
legal counsel was unenforceable.78 The Court of Appeals will be faced with
the issue of reconciling the state’s prohibition of certain restrictive
covenants in law firm partnership agreements with the unfinished business
doctrine because the doctrine creates effects similar to restrictions on the
practice of law.
A. Development Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &
Feld LLP
In May 2012, Judge McMahon of the Southern District of New York
held that the unfinished business doctrine applies to client matters that law
firms bill by the hour because unfinished matters are partnership assets for
which partners owe a duty to account.79 The plaintiff, Development
Specialists, Inc. (DSI), was the administrator of the bankruptcy estate of

71

Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 738–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Dev. Specialists, Inc. v.
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 331–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
72
See Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 344, 349.
73
See Geron, 476 B.R. at 743.
74
Id. at 745; Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, No. 11 civ. 5994
(CM), 2012 WL 2952929 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012).
75
Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. K&L Gates LLP (In re Coudert Bros.), No. 12-4916 (L) (2d Cir. Dec. 2,
2013) (Bloomberg Law, Dockets, Req. No. 83), certified questions accepted, 2014 WL 113013 (N.Y.
Jan. 14, 2014); Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213 (2d Cir.), certified
questions accepted, 2013 WL 6499301 (N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013).
76
550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989).
77
E.g., Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So. 2d 765, 770 (Ala. 1996);
Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 138 P.3d 723, 727, 732 (Ariz. 2006); Howard v.
Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 158, 163 (Cal. 1993); Neuman v. Akman, 715 A.2d 127, 131–37 (D.C. 1998);
Donnelly v. Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville, Schoenebaum, & Walker, P.L.C., 599 N.W.2d
677, 680, 682 (Iowa 1999); Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 588 A.2d 1287, 1292 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1991), rev’d, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992).
78
See 550 N.E.2d at 411.
79
See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 326, 332
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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Coudert Brothers LLP, a law firm that dissolved in 2005.80 DSI sued ten
law firms that former Coudert partners joined in an attempt to recover
profits that the firms earned on Coudert’s pending, uncompleted client
matters.81 The issue before the court was whether the hourly client matters
were in fact partnership property subject to winding up.82 Judge McMahon
analyzed how the state’s highest court would address the issue and set forth
numerous arguments that I have categorized into four points below.
1.

Cases Are Partnership Property, and Partnership Property
Belongs to the Partnership, Not to the Individual Partners.—The
DSI court examined the fundamental concept of a partnership. The court
found that because a partnership is comprised of a group of co-owners who
carry on a business, it would be contrary to partnership law to find that the
firm’s pending cases belong to individual partners.83 It reasoned that the
billing arrangement between a client and the firm should have no bearing
on whether cases are assets.84 The court recognized that only unfinished
business—not new business from a client that partners take on after the
partnership dissolves—is an asset of the partnership.85 New business cannot
be an asset since a law firm only has an expectation of obtaining new
business.86 As such, an attorney who collects fees associated with new
business has no duty to share the earnings with former partners.
The court rejected the argument that because a client has the right to
terminate a relationship with an attorney at will, Coudert’s pending cases
are not partnership assets.87 It explained how executory contracts can be
partnership assets, citing Stem v. Warren,88 where the New York Court of
Appeals held that a contract for architectural services was a partnership
asset even though the contract was terminable at will.89
2.

Other UPA Jurisdictions Treat Hourly Matters as Assets of the
Partnership.—The court cited a handful of cases that have
cursorily considered whether hourly pending cases are assets of the

80

Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 322.
82
See id. at 326.
83
See id. at 331–32 (“A law partnership not only possesses fixed assets in the form of typewriters,
bookcases, etc., it possesses assets in the form of cases and legal matters.” (quoting In re Lester, 403
N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (App. Div. 1978))).
84
Id. at 332.
85
See id.
86
Id. However, arguably, a law firm never has more than an expectation of obtaining future
business associated with unfinished business since clients can discharge their attorneys at will.
87
See id. at 333.
88
125 N.E. 811 (N.Y. 1920).
89
See Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 333–34.
81
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partnership and concluded that they are.90 The court emphasized that New
York law instructs courts to harmonize their rulings with other
jurisdictions’ interpretations of the UPA.91
3.

The Differences Between Contingent Fee and Hourly Billable
Arrangements Are Not Meaningful.—The law firm defendants
argued that Coudert’s interest—and therefore the bankruptcy trustee’s
interest—in hourly matters is limited to the number of hours Coudert
performed before it dissolved, multiplied by the applicable hourly rate.92
However, the DSI court found that the only difference between contingent
fee and hourly matters is “when and how” a client compensates a law
firm.93 The court rejected the contention that hourly billing gives rise to a
series of “mini-contracts” where unfinished business “becomes ‘finished
business’ with the submission of each periodic invoice.”94 More
specifically, the court stated that hourly billable work is not like a monthto-month lease because lawyers enter into agreements to provide legal
counsel generally or for specific matters.95 And even though a law firm is
entitled to recover the quantum meruit value of the work it has performed
on contingency when a client discharges the firm, this principle operates
separately from the fiduciary duties partners owe one another during
dissolution.96
Further, the court distinguished the rights that law firms have against
clients and the rights that partners have against one another. A law firm has
a right against its clients to be paid for the work it has performed.97 Partners
have a duty to account to former partners all earnings from partnership
assets that existed on the date of dissolution.98 Unless otherwise agreed
upon, all partners are entitled to a share of those earnings based on an
allocation set forth in the partnership agreement.99 The argument that
unfinished contingent fee matters are partnership assets, whereas
unfinished hourly matters are not because of differences in payment
90

See id. at 336–37 (citing Robinson v. Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–6 (D.D.C. 1997);
Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R.
318, 333 n.20 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Ashdale (In re
Labrum & Doak, LLP), 227 B.R. 391, 408 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d
571, 572–73 (Ct. App. 1993)).
91
Id. at 336 (citing N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 4(4) (McKinney 2006) (“This chapter shall be so
interpreted and construed as to effect its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it.”)).
92
See id. at 337.
93
Id. at 339.
94
Id. at 337–38.
95
Id. at 339.
96
See id. at 338.
97
See id.
98
Id.
99
See id. at 335–36.
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structure, “conflates a law firm’s rights against its clients . . . and the rights
of former partners among themselves.”100 In other words, the compensation
structure of a client matter has no bearing on the relationship and duties
among partners.101
4.

New York’s Public Policy Does Not Require Hourly Matters to Be
Treated Differently than Contingent Fee Matters.—The DSI court
observed that the law firm defendants’ strongest argument was that the
unfinished business doctrine would create a financial disincentive for an
attorney to continue representing a client on an existing, unfinished
matter.102 Under New York law (and in most states that have addressed the
issue), provisions in partnership agreements are unenforceable if they
create financial disincentives for attorneys to continue representing
clients.103 The genesis of this prohibition in New York is Rule 5.6(a)(1) of
the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that “[a] lawyer
shall not participate in offering or making . . . a partnership . . . agreement
that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the
relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement.”104
The DSI court noted that the New York Court of Appeals, in relying
on the state’s ethics rules, has declined to enforce restrictive provisions in
law firm partnership agreements in two cases where the provisions had
effects similar to the application of the unfinished business doctrine.105 In
Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, the partnership agreement at issue required a
partner who voluntarily withdrew to forfeit his interest in accounts
receivable if he competed with the firm.106 The Cohen court acknowledged
that even though the provision did not prohibit a partner from practicing
law, the monetary penalty restricted the practice of law because it would
discourage a withdrawing partner from continuing to represent clients.107
The court noted that the purpose of the ethics rule that proscribes restrictive
partnership agreements is to ensure choice of counsel.108
Similarly, in Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, the Court
of Appeals refused to enforce a provision in a law firm partnership
agreement that required a former partner to either return a portion of profits
he had previously been allocated or pay a portion of fees that his new firm
100

Id. at 338.
See id. at 339.
102
Id. at 340.
103
See Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989); Robert W. Hillman, Client
Choice, Contractual Restraints, and the Market for Legal Services, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 73 (2007).
104
N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(a)(1) (2012); accord MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 5.6(a) (2013).
105
See 477 B.R. at 340–43.
106
550 N.E.2d at 410–11.
107
Id. at 411.
108
Id.
101
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would bill clients of the old firm.109 The New York Court of Appeals
reiterated similar reasoning that it set forth in Cohen—that financial
disincentives interfere with a client’s choice of counsel.110 The DSI court
stated that Denburg was the case that best supported the law firm
defendants because the financial disincentive in the partnership agreement
had the same effect as the unfinished business doctrine and nocompensation rule.111
However, the DSI court found that the holdings of Cohen and Denburg
were not directly applicable to the case at hand for three reasons. First, both
cases dealt with partnership withdrawal, not partnership dissolution.112
When a partnership is not dissolving, the default UPA rules about winding
up do not take effect.113 In the case of DSI, however, the firm was winding
up, and while a firm is winding up, partners have a duty to wind up the
partnership for the benefit of the partners.114
Second, the unfinished business doctrine did not pertain to Cohen and
Denburg.115 Cohen involved a partner forfeiting compensation if he
competed with the firm he left, while Denburg involved a clause that
required the withdrawing partner to share the earnings related to new
business (as opposed to unfinished business) from former clients.116
Third, the DSI court concluded that the financial disincentives are the
same, whether unfinished business is billed by the hour or on contingency,
because the amount earned must be shared with the partners of the
dissolved firm.117 Although the New York Court of Appeals has never
addressed the issue of the unfinished business doctrine, the opinions of the
Appellate Division indicate that contingent fee cases are assets of a
dissolved law firm; no opinion has held that the financial-disincentive
rationale of Cohen and Denburg is reason not to apply the doctrine.118 Thus,
the court reasoned that applying the unfinished business doctrine to
pending hourly matters does not violate public policy.119
In short, the DSI court held that the unfinished business doctrine
applies to matters billed by the hour. Of particular significance is the
109

624 N.E.2d 995, 997 (N.Y. 1993).
See id. at 998–99.
111
See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 342–43
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
112
Id. at 343.
113
Id.
114
See id. at 323, 327.
115
Id. at 343.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 343–44. But see infra Part III.B (discussing how financial disincentives are greater when
the unfinished business doctrine is applied to hourly matters, as compared to matters billed on
contingency).
118
See Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 344.
119
See id. at 344, 349.
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court’s narrow reading of the ethics rule that proscribes restrictive
agreements in law firm partnership agreements and its interpretation of
Cohen and Denburg. In the next case discussed below, the judge
interpreted the ethics rule and Cohen more liberally.
B. Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP
In September 2012, Judge Pauley120 of the Southern District of New
York held that hourly billable client matters pending on the date of a law
firm’s dissolution are not assets of the partnership.121 Geron is particularly
interesting because it is the first opinion to thoroughly analyze the
application of the unfinished business doctrine to hourly matters and then
conclude that the doctrine does not apply to hourly matters.122 The plaintiff
in the case was the bankruptcy trustee of Thelen LLP, a failed law firm.123
The trustee sued Seyfarth Shaw LLP and Robinson & Cole LLP, two law
firms that hired former Thelen partners and billed clients for pending but
unfinished hourly work that Thelen began.124 In October 2008, when the
firm was insolvent, the partners voted to dissolve Thelen and incorporate a
so-called Jewel waiver into their partnership agreement that waived the
application of the unfinished business doctrine.125 Thelen filed for
bankruptcy in September 2009.126 The trustee’s main contention was that
adding the Jewel waiver constituted a fraudulent transfer.127 Consequently,
the trustee sought to recover the value of the unfinished business that was
“transferred” to the two law firm defendants.
The Geron court examined some of the same issues that the DSI court
considered, ultimately giving greater deference to Cohen—where the New
York Court of Appeals held that a provision in a partnership agreement that
restricted the practice of law was unenforceable—and less deference to
Stem—where the Court of Appeals suggested that terminable-at-will
120

I interned for Judge Pauley during the summer of 2012. At no point was I involved with Geron,
and I have never discussed the case or this Note with Judge Pauley.
121
Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
122
Cf. id. at 739 n.2 (“Over the last three decades, courts have cited Jewel reflexively and
uncritically. Thus, from modest beginnings in a dispute involving a small Alameda County general
practice firm, the Jewel doctrine has grown to ensnare some of the largest law firms in the United
States.”).
123
Id. at 736.
124
Id.
125
Id. (The Jewel waiver stated: “Neither the Partners nor the Partnership shall have any claim or
entitlement to clients, cases or matters ongoing at the time of dissolution of the Partnership other than
the entitlement for collection of amounts due for work performed by the Partners and other Partnership
personnel prior to their departure from the Partnership. [This provision is] intended to expressly waive,
opt out of and be in lieu of any rights any Partner or the Partnership may have to ‘unfinished business’
of the Partnership, as the term is defined in Jewel v. Boxer, . . . or as otherwise might be provided in the
absence of this provision through the interpretation or application of” partnership law.).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 736–37.
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executory contracts are partnership assets. I have categorized the court’s
main arguments into five points below and critiqued its reasoning in a few
instances.
1.

Recognizing a Property Interest in Unfinished Hourly Matters
Violates New York’s Public Policy.—The court noted that New
York has a “strong public policy in favor of client autonomy and attorney
mobility.”128 Reducing the compensation a former partner is entitled to
when that former partner, or that former partner’s new firm, completes all
of the work would provide an “unjust windfall” to the bankruptcy estate.129
The court found that such an unjust windfall is the equivalent of a
restriction on the practice of law that violates public policy, which Cohen
proscribes.130 More specifically, the court noted that the unfinished business
doctrine as applied to hourly matters “clash[es]” with New York’s Rules of
Professional Conduct because Rule 1.5(g) restricts a lawyer’s ability to
share fees with a lawyer who is not part of the same firm.131 The court
acknowledged that even though professional ethics rules are not the law,
“New York courts interpret other laws to harmonize with them where
possible.”132 However, the court overlooked the comments to the ethics
rule, which state that the rule “does not prohibit or regulate division of fees
to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously
associated in a law firm.”133 Ultimately, the Geron court interpreted Cohen
more liberally than did the DSI court, finding that Cohen’s proscription
against restrictive covenants in agreements among attorneys is
incompatible with the unfinished business doctrine.134 The DSI court, on the
other hand, construed Cohen as not restricting the application of the
unfinished business doctrine.135
2.

Recognizing a Property Interest in Unfinished Hourly Matters
Contravenes New York’s Application of the Unfinished Business
Doctrine to Contingent Fee Matters.—The court stated that New
York case law does not necessarily prescribe that 100% of earnings from
unfinished contingent fee matters are partnership assets. The court referred
128

Id. at 742–43.
Id. at 740.
130
See id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(g) cmt. 8 (2012); accord MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 8 (2013). Some courts have held that fee sharing among former law firm partners
who later work in different firms is not a violation of ethics rules because the old partnership continues
to exist until the partnership is fully wound up. E.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Ashdale
(In re Labrum & Doak, LLP), 227 B.R. 391, 414 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485
N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
134
The Geron court did not discuss the significance of Denburg to the holding in Cohen.
135
See supra Part II.A.4.
129
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to Santalucia v. Sebright Transportation, Inc.,136 Shandell v. Katz,137 and
Kirsch v. Leventhal,138 which held that unfinished contingent fee matters
should be valued on the date a partnership dissolves and that any
postdissolution fees earned due to a lawyer’s “post-dissolution efforts, skill
and diligence” need not be shared with former partners.139 The Geron court
applied this logic and reasoned that because postdissolution fees earned on
hourly matters arise from a lawyer’s “post-dissolution efforts, skill and
diligence,” pending hourly cases are not partnership assets subject to the
unfinished business doctrine.140
However, the holdings in Santalucia, Shandell, and Kirsch are the
product of the Second Circuit and Appellate Division misapplying
partnership law.141 Each case involved the dissolution and winding up of a
law firm.142 The three opinions relied on the section of New York
partnership law that parallels Section 42 of the UPA, entitling a
withdrawing partner or estate of a deceased partner to the value of their
partnership interests if the partnership continues to operate without winding
up.143 The three cases sought to apply this principle to the context of
dissolution and winding up by valuing pending contingent fee cases on the
date the law firm dissolved. This was incorrect. Section 42 is inapplicable
when a partnership dissolves and winds up; it only applies when a
partnership continues to operate after a partner withdraws or dies.144
Specifically, the purpose of Section 42 is to compensate an outgoing
partner for the partnership’s continued use of the outgoing partner’s
136

232 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000).
629 N.Y.S.2d 437 (App. Div. 1995).
138
586 N.Y.S.2d 330 (App. Div. 1992).
139
Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 740–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Santalucia,
232 F.3d at 298; Shandell, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 439; Kirsch, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 333).
140
Id. at 741 (quoting Shandell, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 439).
141
See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 347–49
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (expressing doubt that the New York Court of Appeals would follow Santalucia,
Shandell, and Kirsch because the principle they establish “eviscerates” the no-compensation rule).
142
See Santalucia, 232 F.3d at 295; Shandell, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 438; Kirsch, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
143
See Santalucia, 232 F.3d at 298–99 (relying on N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 73 (McKinney 2006));
Shandell, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 439 (same); Kirsch, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 332–33 (same); UPA, supra note 16,
§ 42. Section 42 of the UPA also entitles the outgoing partner to opt for either interest on or profits from
the partnership’s continued use of the partner’s right in the partnership property. However, Section 42
does not entitle an outgoing partner to profits from unfinished business. See Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft v. Beasley, 728 So. 2d 253, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that fees “attributable to the
postdissolution efforts, skill, and diligence of the remaining partners . . . should not be proportionately
attributable to the use of the departing partner’s right in the property of the dissolved partnership”);
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 47, § 7.13(f), at 7:210, :212 (An outgoing partner is not entitled to a
full profit share “because that share was predicated in part on the [outgoing partner’s] contribution of
services . . . . When profits have been elected [under Section 42], the [outgoing partner] must prove . . .
what profits were attributable to the use of partnership assets as distinguished from the services of the
partners.”).
144
See GREGORY, supra note 18, § 228, at 373; HILLMAN, supra note 55, § 4.3.6.2, at 4:39.
137
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capital145—in other words, to prevent an outgoing partner’s capital from
remaining “trapped” in the partnership.146 Therefore, the three opinions
were wrong to rely on New York’s codification of Section 42, and the
principle that Section 42 embraces was likewise of no relevance to Geron.
3.

Recognizing a Property Interest in Hourly Client Matters Would
Result in Bizarre Consequences.—If unfinished hourly matters are
partnership property, then they become property of the bankruptcy estate.
The court indicated that such a holding is nonsensical because “[i]t would
appear . . . that the Bankruptcy Code empowers a debtor law firm to sell its
pending hourly fee matters to the highest bidder”147 given that the Code
authorizes a trustee to “use, sell, or lease” property of the estate.148 This
directly conflicts with a client’s right to choose legal counsel.149 Moreover,
the court acknowledged that recognizing hourly matters as assets of a law
firm might suggest that “a client who discharges a debtor law firm and
transfers his case to a new firm violates the automatic stay”150 under the
Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits “act[s] to obtain possession . . . or to
exercise control over property of the estate.”151 However, the Geron court’s
reasoning here overlooks the reality that it is only the right to earnings
associated with unfinished business that is property of the estate; the actual
cases themselves are not.152 When a client discharges a law firm, that law
firm has a right to compensation for work performed.153 It is this right to
compensation that would become property of the estate.154
4.

Law Firm Partnerships Are Different from Other Types of
Partnerships.—The court explained that it is “overbroad” to
interpret Stem, like the DSI court did, as standing for the rule that
terminable-at-will executory contracts are partnership property.155 In Stem,
the contract between the architecture partnership and the client included a
clause that contemplated that the contract would be performed
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notwithstanding the death of the partner.156 Unlike a contract for
architectural services, the Geron court reasoned that a contract for legal
representation cannot contemplate survival because a client has a right to
discharge an attorney at will.157 And though the contract in Stem was
terminable at will, the Geron court emphasized that contracts for legal
services are “categorically different”158 from other at-will contracts: clients
place the “ultimate trust and confidence” in their legal counsel, and an
“attorney’s obligations . . . transcend those prevailing in the commercial
market place.”159 Applying Stem to contracts for hourly legal fees would
“undermine” the “unique” attorney–client relationship.160
5. New York Need Not Follow Other UPA Jurisdictions.—Finally,
unlike the DSI court, the Geron court rejected the contention that New
York should follow the approach of other states that embrace the UPA,
even though New York partnership law instructs courts to harmonize
rulings on partnership law with other UPA jurisdictions.161 The court
reasoned that the UPA “harmonize[s] partners’ duties regarding partnership
property” but that state common law determines what constitutes
partnership property.162 Thus, the Geron court held that the hourly billable
matters pending on the date a partnership dissolves do not fall within the
ambit of the unfinished business doctrine.163 In other words, unfinished
cases billed by the hour are not partnership assets subject to winding up.
Both DSI and Geron highlight how the unfinished business doctrine
may conflict with the profession’s Rules of Professional Conduct and New
York’s public policy. In DSI, the court gave greater deference to the state’s
codification of the UPA and placed a higher priority on the duties partners
owe one another. In Geron, the court placed a higher priority on the
attorney–client relationship. The New York Court of Appeals will soon
wrestle with the same issues and make a decision about whether the
unfinished business doctrine, as applied to hourly matters, contravenes or
comports with public policy.
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III. APPLYING THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS DOCTRINE TO
HOURLY MATTERS
Two points of contention between DSI and Geron involve whether
public policy precludes the unfinished business doctrine from applying to
hourly matters and whether there are meaningful differences between
hourly billable and contingent fee matters. This Part argues that the
unfinished business doctrine does not contravene public policy and,
therefore, applies to both matters billed by the hour and on contingency.
However, there is a meaningful difference between hourly and contingent
fee matters that may cause former partners to face higher financial
disincentives when completing hourly billable unfinished business. This
Part concludes by suggesting statutory reform to ameliorate the negative
externalities of the doctrine that implicate client choice and a former
partner’s prospects of joining a new firm.164
A. Why the Unfinished Business Doctrine Applies to Hourly Matters
The unfinished business doctrine may infringe clients’ choice of
counsel because of the financial disincentives the doctrine imposes in
certain instances. The effect of the doctrine may have the same impact as
restrictive covenants in partnership agreements that many states prohibit,
such as agreements to forfeit compensation. The impact is troubling
because when it induces a partner to withdraw from a client matter, the
doctrine causes harm to an existing attorney–client relationship, possibly
forcing the client to find a new attorney.165 The New York Court of Appeals
has decided three cases that address the issue of whether agreements among
lawyers that create financial disincentives are enforceable.166 A close
examination of the court’s three opinions suggests that the unfinished
business doctrine, even when applied to hourly matters, does not violate the
state’s public policy, which is concerned with attorneys being improperly
deterred from practicing law. The opinions suggest that Cohen should not
be read as broadly as the Geron court interpreted the case because the
doctrine does not improperly deter competition by requiring a former
partner to pay a penalty or forfeit earnings that belong to the partner.
164
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The first case on restrictive agreements that the New York Court of
Appeals decided, Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, addressed a clause in a
partnership agreement that required a withdrawing partner to forfeit his
interest in accounts receivable if he competed with the firm.167 Relying on
an ethics rule that proscribes agreements that restrict an attorney’s right to
practice law, the court held that the forfeiture clause was unenforceable
because it discouraged partners from continuing to represent clients.168 The
Geron court relied on Cohen when it held that the unfinished business
doctrine does not apply to hourly matters, finding that the doctrine is a
restriction on the practice of law when applied to hourly matters.169 Of
particular importance, however, is that the Cohen court explicitly
“caution[ed] against a categorical interpretation or application” of its
holding.170
The New York Court of Appeals’ second opinion on restrictive
agreements, Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl,171 further
clarified the limits of the ethics rule. The agreement at issue required a
former partner to pay the firm he left the greater of 12.5% of the partner’s
earnings in the prior two years or 12.5% of the amount the new firm billed
clients of the old firm during the ensuing two years.172 As in Cohen, the
court examined the effect of the restrictive provision (as opposed to its
intent) and concluded that it “improperly deter[red] competition and thus
impinge[d] upon clients’ choice of counsel.”173 The key language is
improperly deter, suggesting that some restrictive provisions that deter are
enforceable.
In both Denburg and Cohen, the litigation involved covenants that
required partners to give something up that they were otherwise entitled to
under partnership law and in the partnership agreements. In Cohen, that
was a right to accounts receivable; in Denburg, that was a portion of the
partner’s prior earnings or the partner’s future earnings. Thus, in both
cases, the restrictive covenants did not merely deter competition; they
improperly deterred competition because the agreements sought to take
away something to which the partners were otherwise entitled.
A second issue that the Denburg court addressed further supports the
logic that only restrictive agreements that improperly deter competition are
unenforceable. Prior to the start of the litigation, the departing partner
167
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allegedly told another partner at the firm that the partnership could retain
the balance in his capital account to settle the dispute.174 The departing
partner contested this allegation, and the Appellate Division held that even
if the partner entered into an oral settlement agreement, the settlement was
unenforceable for the same reasons the restrictive covenant was: its effect
deterred competition, which negatively impacted clients’ choice of
counsel.175
The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed and held that if there was a
settlement agreement, it would be enforceable.176 The court reasoned that
countervailing policy reasons that favor the enforcement of settlement
agreements require the settlement agreement to be enforced even though
the restrictive clause was unenforceable.177 Similar to the disclaimer the
court made in Cohen, it emphasized that agreements giving rise to financial
disincentives among lawyers “are not per se illegal but depend on the
particular terms and circumstances.”178
The New York Court of Appeals adopted similar reasoning again in its
third case on the issue of financial disincentives. In Hackett v. Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, the court upheld an arbitrator’s award in a
dispute involving a provision in a law firm partnership agreement that
required withdrawing partners to forfeit supplemental payments if they left
the firm and earned income in excess of $100,000 per year.179 The case
arose after an arbitrator determined that the withdrawing partner was not
entitled to his supplemental payments.180 The withdrawing partner
challenged the arbitrator’s decision, and the trial court held that the
provision in the partnership agreement violated public policy.181
The Court of Appeals distinguished the provision from the
anticompetitive covenants in Cohen and Denburg on the grounds that the
“supplemental payment provision [wa]s not inevitably anticompetitive on
its face.”182 It explained that the $100,000 threshold applied regardless of
whether a departing partner earned that much competing with the firm or
pursuing another lucrative opportunity.183 Finally, the court reiterated its
reasoning in Denburg—that “anticompetition policy may yield to other
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public policy concerns,” such as those favoring arbitration, which the
parties already consented to and underwent.184
These three cases, when read together, suggest that restrictive
covenants are anticompetitive and, therefore, unenforceable when they
improperly deter competition (negatively affecting clients’ right to counsel)
by requiring a partner to give something up that the partner is otherwise
entitled to under the partnership agreement or under partnership law—for
example, forfeiting an interest that the partner is entitled to (as in Cohen),
or paying a penalty because the partner is competing with the firm by
continuing to practice law (as in Denburg). Moreover, the latter two
opinions suggest that Cohen should not be read as broadly as the Geron
court interpreted the case. In both Denburg and Hackett, though the Court
of Appeals acknowledged that clauses that improperly deter competition
are unenforceable, the court recognized that the policy behind the ethics
rule that proscribes restrictive agreements among attorneys may yield to
countervailing policy considerations.185
The unfinished business doctrine arises out of partnership law because
of policy concerns. It does not exact a penalty or require a partner to
disgorge earnings that the partner is otherwise entitled to because partners
wind up a partnership and complete unfinished business for the benefit of
the partnership. Rather, the doctrine seeks to delineate the scope of
fiduciary duties among partners when a firm is dissolving. It reduces the
incentive for partners to compete for the most profitable cases, diminishes
the likelihood that partners will steal client files so that they may continue
working on existing client matters for personal gain, and reduces the need
for judicial intervention.186 Moreover, the point of the doctrine is not to
deter competition, but rather to reinforce fiduciary duties among partners
that restrain them from using the partnership to obtain personal gain.187
Therefore, not all agreements or relationships among partners that may
have a detrimental effect on client choice are per se unenforceable. Because
the unfinished business doctrine is a function of partnership law that
upholds fiduciary duties as a partnership winds up, the doctrine does not
clash with New York law, the UPA, or RUPA, whether it is applied to
matters billed by the hour or on contingency.
B. The Difference Between Hourly and Contingent Fee Matters
Though the previous section advocates that the unfinished business
doctrine should apply to hourly matters in the same way that it applies to
contingent fee matters, this may not be optimal for attorneys and their
184
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clients. There are important distinctions between hourly and contingent fee
matters, and these distinctions make the financial disincentives greater
when the unfinished business doctrine is applied to hourly matters.
Contingent fee and hourly billable matters are inherently different.
Contingency arrangements function as financing devices that allow clients
to pursue their legal claims without paying out of pocket.188 The
arrangement is a sort of “risk-sharing joint venture” where the attorney
assumes the risk that the client will recover nothing.189 Consequently,
contingent fee agreements compensate for this risk by awarding law firms a
significant share of a settlement or judgment.190
The financial disincentives that the unfinished business doctrine
creates are not as great when a client matter is billed on contingency. The
reason for this is because if an attorney withdraws from a case billed on
contingency, the attorney forfeits the right to all compensation associated
with that matter, regardless of how much time and effort the attorney has
already spent.191 This makes the case appear more financially appealing
going forward. In determining whether to continue representing a client
after a law firm dissolves, the attorney will disregard the total number of
hours that the attorney already worked on the matter because, unlike with
hourly matters, the attorney will not be compensated for that time if the
attorney withdraws. The time, effort, and costs that the attorney already
expended are sunk costs. Instead, the attorney will consider whether the
potential contingency fee is sufficient to justify the estimated number of
hours needed to complete the matter.192
For example, assume that a contingency fee case is expected to
recover $10 million and that the attorney handling the case is entitled to
188
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one-tenth of the 30% contingency fee because the remaining former
partners of the dissolved firm are entitled to nine-tenths under the
unfinished business doctrine. The attorney will consider whether it is worth
the total number of additional hours to finish the case and earn $300,000
(i.e., one-tenth of the total $3 million contingency fee). Because the
attorney earns nothing by withdrawing, it becomes irrelevant how much
time the attorney already spent on the case. The less time needed to
complete the case, the greater the incentive exists for the attorney to
continue representing the client. If a case is close to the point of potential
recovery, it will likely be worthwhile to expend the time to seek the fees
that the attorney would otherwise forfeit.
In the hypothetical above, if the attorney only needs to work an
additional 100 hours on the case, the effective hourly rate is $3000 to the
attorney and new firm completing the case (since the partner is entitled to
one-tenth of the $3 million contingency fee). The hourly rate appears high
because it is irrelevant how many hours the attorney spent on the case
before the partnership dissolved, considering that the attorney would
otherwise forfeit the contingency fee by withdrawing. In other words, the
stopwatch is reset in calculating the earnings per hour going forward for
unfinished business billed on contingency. In this instance, the unfinished
business doctrine imposes financial disincentives only if the attorney can
work on other client matters that yield fees in excess of $3000 per hour.
As for hourly billable matters, the stopwatch never resets; the hourly
rate is a constant. If the partner with a 10% interest in a dissolved law firm
bills out at $500 per hour, the partner’s new firm would only be entitled to
$50 per hour because the remaining 90% belongs to the other partners of
the former firm. The disincentive is greater for hourly matters because the
new firm can never earn more than $50 per hour going forward. Thus, for
every hour the partner spends on unfinished business, the new firm incurs
an opportunity cost of $450 since it would be entitled to that much more
per hour on matters that are not unfinished business. The partner will be
less inclined to continue working on hourly unfinished business if the
attorney can work on other matters and bill $500 per hour instead.
These two scenarios illustrate that a partner may face elevated
financial disincentives when unfinished business cases are billed by the
hour. For a contingent fee matter, the effects of sunk costs cause a firm to
earn more per hour going forward. This may induce a partner to complete
profitable contingent fee unfinished business. However, for hourly matters,
a former partner may be incentivized to withdraw from a case because the
partner would not be forfeiting the possibility of earning a large payout.
Jewel recognized that an attorney will not be unduly burdened if other
former partners also continue to work on unfinished business.193 Despite
193
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this possibility, a free-rider problem exists where each former partner
prefers working on matters that are not unfinished business but hopes that
the other former partners will work on unfinished business. Therefore, even
though the unfinished business doctrine should apply to matters billed by
the hour and on contingency, the doctrine as it stands is not optimal.
C. A Proposed Statutory Solution
Part I.B discussed how the unfinished business doctrine may
negatively affect clients’ choice of counsel and suggested that law firms
may be wary of taking on new partners of dissolved firms because of the
liability that the unfinished business doctrine imposes. The previous section
argued that the unfinished business doctrine creates greater financial
disincentives that further impair client choice when the doctrine is applied
to hourly matters as compared to matters billed on contingency. This
section proposes a solution to ameliorate the negative externalities that the
unfinished business doctrine creates in New York and other UPA
jurisdictions.
As compared to the majority of states, New York is behind the times;
its partnership law is still based on the UPA, a century-old model statute.194
RUPA, the revised act from 1997, eliminated the no-compensation rule,
instead allowing a partner to earn reasonable compensation for completing
unfinished business when a partnership agreement is otherwise silent on the
matter.195 This is a step in the right direction because when a partner—or a
new firm that the partner joins—is entitled to reasonable compensation, the
partner will have a greater incentive to complete a client’s unfinished
business, providing continuity for the client’s representation. Moreover, a
firm taking on a new partner will be less wary of unfinished business
because the new firm will be entitled to reasonable compensation.
Reasonable compensation, therefore, reduces the externalities of the
unfinished business doctrine that infringe clients’ choice of counsel. It
benefits attorneys and law firms completing unfinished business, as well as
clients, who are able to retain their choice of counsel. For default
partnership law, reasonable compensation is an appropriate measure
because it requires the fees that exceed reasonable compensation to be
shared with partners of the former partnership. This is consistent with the
principle that partners owe fiduciary duties to one another, including while
they wind up the partnership for the benefit of the partners.196
Rather than revamp the entire body of New York partnership law,
which would be time-consuming to say the least, the legislature could
194
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simply strike out a single word in the statute, thereby allowing partners to
earn reasonable compensation for completing unfinished business. The
statute would read: “No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the
partnership business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to
reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the partnership
affairs.”197 By eliminating the word surviving, a partner is no longer limited
to earning reasonable compensation for winding up the partnership when
another partner dies.198 Alternatively, the legislature could replace the entire
sentence with the updated language from RUPA, which states: “A partner
is not entitled to remuneration for services performed for the partnership,
except for reasonable compensation for services rendered in winding up the
business of the partnership.”199 Either approach suffices as an effective
“quick fix” to New York’s antiquated statute.
Allowing reasonable compensation will alleviate but not eliminate all
negative externalities that the doctrine may impose. Because reasonable
compensation is a subjective measure, what constitutes reasonable
compensation and what constitutes excessive compensation may become
the subject of a lawsuit. For example, a former partner or a bankruptcy
trustee of a dissolved firm may sue former partners and the law firms that
they join for profits earned on unfinished business that exceed reasonable
compensation.200 While this remains an issue that partners and the law firms
they join face, alternative default law is more problematic. Entitling a
partner to anything less than reasonable compensation for winding up the
unfinished business of a law firm infringes clients’ choice of counsel and a
former partner’s prospects of becoming a partner at another law firm. In
contrast, entitling a partner to anything more than reasonable compensation
vitiates the concept of a partnership by undermining the fiduciary duty that
partners owe one another to wind up the firm for the benefit of the partners.
Of course, law firms could also be more diligent by updating their
partnership agreements to specify how fees from unfinished business
should be allocated if the firm dissolves. Adding a Jewel waiver while the
law firm is solvent will allow law firms to circumvent the unfinished
business doctrine.201
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As it currently stands, the judiciary is not in a position to engineer the
UPA’s no-compensation rule because the legislative intent of the rule is
unambiguous: partners are only entitled to reasonable compensation for
winding up a partnership after the death of another partner. Further, the nocompensation rule is not contrary to public policy because it does not
improperly deter competition.202 Thus, it is up to the legislatures of New
York and other UPA jurisdictions to modernize their statutes.
CONCLUSION
The application of the unfinished business doctrine is controversial
from the perspectives of both the client and the former partner. The
doctrine may negatively affect clients’ choice of counsel because it may
make other matters more financially appealing to attorneys, thereby
inducing an attorney to withdraw from unfinished business. From the
standpoint of a former partner, the doctrine may act like a restrictive
agreement that creates a financial disincentive for the partner to continue
working on unfinished business. The doctrine may also impair a former
partner’s prospects of becoming a partner at a new firm because a firm may
not wish to share earnings or assume liability for completing unfinished
business that the partner brings. The externalities affecting client choice
may become elevated when the doctrine is applied to hourly matters
because an attorney who works on a contingent fee matter would otherwise
forfeit the contingency fee if the attorney withdrew.
Despite the controversies surrounding the doctrine, it does exist for
policy reasons—to ensure that partners fulfill their fiduciary duties in all
dealings with the partnership, to prevent animosity among partners when a
law firm begins to crumble, and to reduce the need for judicial intervention.
Because of these countervailing policy considerations, the doctrine does
not improperly deter competition, whether it applies to matters billed by the
hour or on contingency. Thus, the unfinished business doctrine does not
violate the ethics rules of the legal profession or contravene public policy.
Unless partners of a law firm have agreed otherwise, the unfinished
business doctrine should apply with equal force to hourly and contingent
fee matters.
The New York legislature and other UPA jurisdictions should
eliminate the no-compensation rule and instead allow partners to earn
reasonable compensation for winding up a dissolved firm. Doing so will
mitigate the negative externalities of the unfinished business doctrine.
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